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1 Introduction 1 more high-intensive technology sectors. A minimal requirement needed to make a wise decision is to take into account the opportunity cost of the tourism option in terms of the how the resulting economic performance will in ‡uence sustainability. Despite this need, the information and the analytical tools available in current economic literature are still unable to provide a satisfying assessment of the performance of an economy specialized in tourism.
This de…ciency becomes far more relevant once we consider a stylised fact that recently appeared in some empirical analyses based on international crosscountry datasets. These studies show that, in recent years, small "tourism countries" grew at a signi…cantly larger annual rate than the other small countries. In particular, during the last 20 years, the growth performance of "tourism countries"has been better than in OECD countries (Brau, Lanza and Pigliaru, (2003) ) and the income level of these small "tourism countries" is generally above average. This positive relative performance poses interesting questions concerning the economic mechanisms that lie behind it and the sustainability of long-run economic performance associated to specializing in tourism. In particular, it is important to ascertain whether the positive economic performance of such countries is due to a rapid and unsustainable exploitation of the natural resources or if it is a more robust and sustainable phenomenon.
In this paper, our aim is not to deal with growth-related issues. Growth can be introduced in our framework (for example by means of an exogenous increase in the willingness to pay motivated by favorable terms of trade as illustrated in Lanza and Pigliaru (1994) and Rey-Maquieira, Gomez and Lozano (2004) or by international transmissions of growth from the tourism services importer to the exporter as in Nowak and Sahli (2005) ), but it would nonetheless remain in the background and have no e¤ect on the steady state level of the environmental quality and of tourist ‡ows. Our objective is to analyse the dynamic properties, and the long-run relationship between the sustainability of environmental resources, economic performance and welfare in an economy which has already made the decision to specialize in tourism.
Although this problem seems particularly relevant, it appears to be rather unexplored. There are a large number of studies and a large body of literature dealing with the issue of the relationship between growth and environmental resources (see Beltratti (1996) for a comprehensive survey of the literature) but not many studies have dealt with the issue of the environmental consequences of specializing in tourism. Yet, the problem is particularly interesting from the theoretical point of view. Although the di¢ culties in …nding a clear and satisfactory de…nition for the concept of a "tourist good" are well known, the latter seems to have a peculiarity not shared many other goods: the determinants of its demand (and therefore of its equilibrium price, ceteris paribus) can be negatively in ‡uenced by the demand itself. In other words, excessive demand for tourism services provided by a given destination may lead to an impoverishment of the quality of these services and, ultimately, to a worsening of economic performance. This paper makes an attempt to fully understand the dynamics and long-run consequences involved in this issue. We assume that the supply of tourist services negatively a¤ects the stock of environmental, natural and cul-tural resources of our destination and we identify tourism goods as a bundle of services whose equilibrium price depends positively on the following two characteristics: 1) the stock of environmental, natural and cultural resources and 2) the number of tourists entries in the destination. While the presence of the …rst factor in the hedonic price function of tourists is common to other related works (Rey-Maquieira, Lozano and Gomez (2004) ; Candela and Cellini, (2004) ), the second factor is introduced in order to account for the fact that tourists might not be merely interested in the quantity of the environmental resources, but rather more in the quality of the tourist services supplied. And since the degree of congestion of a tourist destination is an important determinant of the quality of tourist services (Brau and Cao, 2005) , tourists'willingness to pay may well decrease accordingly, other things being equal, when the number of tourists entering a destination increases. In other words, we are dealing speci…cally with crowding-averse tourists 1 . Making the standard assumption that tourist services are purchased only by foreign tourists, we analyse the steady-state properties of two versions of the same model. In the …rst version, private agents can only use their tourist revenues to purchase a homogenous consumption good from abroad. Within this framework we show that the long-run equilibrium is a saddle point in both the market and the central planner solution, where the former di¤ers from the latter to the extent that agents'take tourists'willingness to pay (WTP) as given, while the central planner does not. We …nd an explicit solution for the steady state values of the relevant variables in each of the two cases and, as expected, the stock of environmental resources and the number of tourist entries are respectively higher and lower in the centralized solution. Then we study the e¤ect of a corrective tax policy, showing the existence of an optimal tax rate capable of leading the economy towards its …rst-best dynamic path, and we compare it with the e¤ect of "pollution" income tax whose revenues are invested by the government in pollution abatement technology. We …nd that for low values of the natural regeneration rate (i.e. the rate that governs the dynamics of environmental assets when no resources are invested in pollution abatement technology), a pollution tax increases steady state utility with respect to the market solution. For particularly low values of the natural regeneration rate, a pollution tax can even do better than a …rst-best corrective tax scheme. In the second version, we consider the hypothesis that agents save part of their income in order to invest resources in pollution abatement technology which arti…cially increases the rate of regeneration of an environmental asset. We solve the market and central planner solution and show the locally saddle point properties of the equilibrium in both cases. What we …nd is that agents decide to save resources if and only if the marginal productivity of the abatement e¤ort is low enough. Moreover, we also …nd that the central planner solution implies a lower fraction of resources devoted to abate pollution when tourists are 'crowding-averse'. In our framework, this situation corresponds to a low value of the natural regeneration rate. Finally, we apply the same policy exercise of the …rst version …nding that, in this case: 1) a corrective tax may increase steady-state utility with respect to the market solution but cannot totally correct the externality e¤ect; 2) a pollution tax-scheme is not capable of shifting the economy from the market dynamic path.
Apart from the literature dealing with the dynamic problem of exhaustible resources, other related literature includes Rey-Maquieira, Lozano and Gomez (2004) and (2005), where similar results are obtained with reference to the relationship between market and centralized solution but where, unlike in the present model, the stock of environmental resources is identi…ed with the fraction of land devoted to traditional activities and for which no abatement expenditures are possible. On the contrary, Candela and Cellini (2004) consider the dynamic decision of investing in pollution abatement technology but this decision is faced by a representative tourist …rm willing to maximize the discounted sum of expected future pro…ts. Neither of these studies though, have considered crowding-adverse tourists.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the analytical framework; section 3 solves the …rst version of the model and …nds the optimal corrective tax rate; section 4 introduces pollution abatement technology but restricts its availability to government initiative only; in section 5 the fraction of income devoted to abatement expenditures becomes a choice variable for both the agents and the central planner. Section 6 concludes.
The analytical framework
We consider an economy which supplies tourist services to foreign tourists. We assume that each tourist, at any time t; buys one unit of tourism services so that output at time t is measured in terms of tourist entries n t . As in Rey-Maquieira Palmer, Lozano and Gomez (2004) and (2005), we assume the existence of a hedonic price function where the equilibrium price is positively a¤ected by the quality of the tourism product. We assume the latter depends on two characteristics: positively on the stock of cultural, natural and environmental resources 2 available at time t in our destination, E t and, negatively, on the total number of tourist entries at time t; n t :
Using a Cobb-Douglas functional form, we can express it as
where is a positive scaling parameter 3 . can be interpreted as a measure of preference for the environmental quality, while is a measure of crowding aversion. We assume that both and belong to the interval (0; 1) R 2 so that p EE < 0; p nn < 0:
Notice that (2) can be also written as
so that the willingness to pay can be viewed as an increasing and concave function of "per-capita environment" E n and an increasing or decreasing concave function of the number of tourist entries depending on whether is positive or negative. Alternatively, if we interpret the inverse of per-capita environment ( n E ) as a measure of the crowding of the destination, we are then assuming that tourists are crowding-averse. The term n t can be considered as an additional preference (if > ) or aversion (if > ) over the number of tourists in the destination 4 The supply side of the economy is made up of a large number of competing representative family …rms which we normalize to 1: Each of them chooses the number of tourists n t to be hosted in a unit of time. We assume that the international demand for tourism is in…nite for the price level which corresponds to the tourists' willingness to pay and is nil for any other price level. So the market clears all the time and the quantity of n t exchanged is totally determined by the supply side. Tourism revenues correspond to the value of the economy's output and are given by
As for the demand side, we assume that the economy is populated by a single in…nitely-lived representative agent whose utility at time t depends positively on both consumption c t and the stock of environmental, cultural and natural resources E t . Her lifetime utility is therefore given by an in…nite sum of logarithmic instantaneous utility
The model without abatement expenditures
When no resources are devoted to defending the environment, tourism revenues are entirely used to purchase homogeneous consumption goods produced abroad.
Since we are dealing with a small economy, we can assume that the price of the consumption good is exogenously …xed and cannot be in ‡uenced by our economy. Without loss of generality we can assume that the price of consumption is equal to 1: Therefore,
Following Becker (1982) and Cazzavillan and Musu (2001) , the environmental resource stock is de…ned as the di¤erence between the maximum tolerable pollution stock P and the current pollution stock 0 P t P E t = P P t Di¤erentiating with respect to time we obtain the law of evolution of the environmental stock
We then assume that a constant proportion 0 < m 0 < 1 of the pollution stock is assimilated at each date t by the natural factors that govern the economy. Moreover, we assume that the asset E decreases proportionally with the level of tourist entries. When no resources can be devoted to abatement expenditures, residents can in ‡uence the environmental asset only controlling tourist entries n t :
where > 0.
Combining (5) and (6) we …nally get
which represents the motion equation for the state variable E:
The market solution
In the market solution, residents choose the number of tourists allowed to enter and the level of consumption in order to maximize the lifetime utility function taking the price p (E; n) as given. That is, they do not take into account that their decisions over n can negatively in ‡uence foreigners'willingness to pay either directly (foreign tourists are crowding adverse) or indirectly (the number of tourist arrivals negatively in ‡uence the stock of environmental resources which positively a¤ect the WTP). Hence, they solve the following problem max fct;ntg
s:t: :
This is an optimal control problem with one state-variable E t and two control variables (c and n): However, one control variable can be eliminated by means of the budget constraint (9) . The …rst order condition and euler equation are
So that the resulting dynamic system is
Steady state analysis
We are interested in an equilibrium which implies sustainability for the stock of cultural, environmental and natural resources, i.e., _ E = 0: As we can easily see from (12) , _ E = 0 implies _ n = 0: The two equilibrium manifold _ n = 0 and _ E = 0 are given by
Existence and uniqueness are easily proved by a quick inspection of the geometrical properties of the two loci. They are two straight lines with positive and negative inclination, respectively. Since n 2 (E) has a positive vertical intercept, they intersect only once in the positive orthant (E; n) plane and unique steady state is then given by
As for stability, we can state the following Proposition 1 The equilibrium (E ss ; n ss ) is locally a saddle point for the system (11), (12) Proof. See the appendix.
All the steady state values of the relevant variables (the two control variables c and n and the state variable E) can then be expressed as functions of the parameter of the model.
As for the stock of cultural, environmental and natural resources, it's clear that: 1) as residents'care for environmental quality increases, the steady state value of E increases too ( @Ess @ > 0); 2) the stock of environmental resources grows (proportionally) with the maximum tolerable level of pollution ( @Ess @ P > 0); 3) steady state value of E is positively in ‡uenced by the regeneration capacity ( @Ess @m0 > 0); 4) if agents care less about the future, they end-up with a lower steady state level of environment ( @Ess @ < 0). It is worth noticing that if people do not care at all about the environment ( = 0), the result will be the total exploitation of it ( E ss j =0 = 0). This is because when = 0; since agents do not take into account the fact that the stock of environment positively in ‡uences tourism revenues through the foreigner's willingness to pay, they will have no particular reason to desire a positive value of E:
As for tourist numbers, they will 1) decrease with greater care of the environment Steady state consumption, which in this model is equal to income, is given by
It is interesting to analyze the behavior of consumption with respect to environmental care : When = 0 (i.e. residents do not care about environment per se), steady-state consumption is zero: since when = 0 the markets …nd it optimal to totally exploit the environment, then tourism revenues (which positively depend on the stock of environmental resources through the tourists' WTP) are also zero. As grows, the e¤ect on the tourist revenues (and therefore on consumption) is ambiguous: on the one hand, it allows for a higher steady state level of the environmental asset and therefore brings a higher tourist revenues. On the other, a higher means a lower steady state level of n which reduces consumption. By calculations we …nd that
m0 ( m0 (1 ) such that steady state con-8 sumption is maximum in the decentralized solution 6 . If is low ( < ) ; an increase in the love for the environment (as a result of campaigns to sensitize public awareness) gives rise to an increase in consumption too. This is because, when E is very low, the marginal value that tourists will assign to the environment is very high so that their WTP increases signi…cantly when E increases. This is what happens when grows starting from very low values. As long as this positive e¤ect of an increase in is larger (in absolute term) than the negative e¤ect of on n ss ; there will be an increase in tourist expenditures and therefore in consumption too. The relationship reverses when the increase in leads to a value of E associated with a su¢ ciently low marginal utility for tourists. Hence, we obtain a sort of golden rule level of with respect to consumption.
The central planner solution
An hypothetical central planner would be aware of the fact that an increase in the number of tourists has a negative e¤ect on the foreign tourist's willingness to pay. As a consequence, the central planner would take this element into account in solving the optimization problem. Internalizing the price e¤ect, the problem becomes max fct;ntg
whereas the FOC and the euler equation are
t E t Di¤erentiating the FOC and equating it to the euler equation, we obtain the following dynamic system 6 The same level of represents instead a maximum when steady state consumption is considered as a function of impatience :
So that an increase in impatience may give rise to a higher consumption in the steady state if the love for the environment is su¢ ciently high. 
Steady state analysis
The _ nt nt = 0 and _ E t = 0 loci are as follows
It is clear that n cp 1 (E) < n 1 (E) ; 8E > 0 Since the _ E t = 0 locus remains unchanged, sustainable development in the central planner solution is guaranteed by a lower level of n. The two loci have the same geometric behavior as n 1 (E) and n 2 (E) ; the steady state exists, is unique and is given by
As for stability, we can state the following Proposition 2 The equilibrium (E cp ; n cp ) is locally a saddle point for the system (16), (15).
Proof. In the appendix. The signs of the derivatives with respect to ; ; m 0 and do not change, but now we also have
Let's brie ‡y comment these results. The positive relationship between the optimal steady-state solution of E and the elasticity of the WTP with respect to price plainly evident: the more tourists care for the environment, the more they are willing to pay for entering a country characterized by a high level of environmental quality; as a consequence, the central planner will supply a higher environmental quality in the steady state. But steady state environment is also a positive function of the degree of crowding aversion : as grows, the central planner tends to choose a lower number of n in steady state and this choice will, ceteris paribus, provide a higher steady-state stock of environmental resources. As for the equilibrium level of n; it is a negative function of both (since tourist entries have a negative e¤ect on the environmental quality, the central planner tends to choose a lower level of n as tourists' concern for the environment increases) and (quite intuitively, the equilibrium level of n is a negative function of the degree of crowding aversion).
As in the decentralized case, consumption behavior is less clear. Optimal consumption is given by
Once again, we …nd a which maximizes consumption
and we can see that gr cp < gr ss : Hence, a golden rule level of also exists in the central planner solution but here consumption as a function of is maximum for a lower level of with respect to the decentralized solution: since the planner takes the change in tourists'WTP into account, a lower degree of environmental care is needed in order to reach the maximum consumption 7 . So that the maximum level of consumption is higher in the central planner case.
A comparison between the optimal and the decentralized solution
It is easy to note that we will always have
the di¤erence lies in the fact that now the parameters and (respectively the elasticity of the willingness to pay with respect to environmental quality and tourist entries) are determinants of the steady state values of n and E; whereas they were absent in the decentralized solution. This is particularly important since and can be considered as policy instruments 8 . As a consequence, we see that, unlike in the decentralized case, E cp is strictly positive when residents do not care about the environment ( = 0).
9 This is because the central planner 7 Is the golden rule level of consumption higher in the optimal or in the decentralized solution? The question is not trivial since both the central planner and residents maximize utility which depends on both consumption and the stock of environmental resources. In order to answer this question we have to calculate ccp gr cp and css gr ss : On calculating, we get that ccp gr cp < css ( gr ss ) 8 As already said, di¤erent values of and can be associated to di¤erent kind of tourism demand. From this point of view, choosing for example a higher means identifying more crowding-averse tourists as potential purchasers of the tourist services produced. 9 Speci…cally
knows that the stock of environmental resources is important not only per se, but also because environment positively a¤ects tourists'WTP and therefore it increases tourism revenues and consumption. Since consumption is a positive function of both n and E; it's not so clear whether steady state optimal consumption is higher or lower than it is in the decentralized steady state level. We know that r ( ) = (1 )
so that there is one and only = r such that c cp > (<) c ss for any < (>) r Hence, if the level of environmental care is low, consumption is higher in the optimal solution. By contrast, if is su¢ ciently high ( > r ) ; consumption is higher in the market solution (see …g.1 10 )
A corrective tax on residents'income
In real economies, the central planner cannot impose the optimal consumption path but can implement a …scal policy that encourages individuals to choose values for the variables which are closer to the optimum with respect to the market solution. In this setting a …rst-best policy scheme is possible and is very simple. The central planner can tax tourism revenues and then simply redistribute the tax gains with lump-sum transfers. The government's budget balance is then n t p (E t ; n t ) = v t
Residents maximize utility taking p (E t ; n t ) and v t as given. The problem is now
The …rst-order condition and the euler equation are
Once residents make their choice we can substitute for v t = n t p (E t ; n t ) and p (E t ; n t ) = n t E t :The resulting dynamic system is
In steady state, when _ E = _ n = 0; we have
The _ E = 0 manifold is not in ‡uenced by the tax (n 2 (E) = n cp 2 (E) = n ss 2 (E)) so that the aim of the CP is simply to …nd a tax rate such that the _ n = 0 manifold associated to the corrective tax coincides with the _ n = 0 manifold in the central planner solution
: n 1 (E) = n cp 1 (E) The tax rate which satis…es this condition is the following
the higher the degree of the externalities ( and ) and the lower the residents'environmental care, the higher the tax must be.
The e¤ect of abatement expenditures
From this section on, we will analyze the e¤ect of the introduction of abatement expenditures in the model. There are several ways to introduce pollution abatement technology in this model. This kind of technology may be introduced in order to 1) increase the level of maximum tolerable pollution P ; 2) reduce the marginal impact of the number of tourists on environmental resources; 3) increase the natural rate of regeneration capacity. Here we focus on the latter. We introduce a continuous function m dt yt such that the dynamics of the environmental asset is given by
where d t stands for abatement expenditures and dt yt represents the fraction of national income devoted to abatement technology. We exclude the possibility that the country can borrow resources from abroad, so that abatement expenditures must be drawn from national income and so reduce consumption possibilities. Then, it must be that d t y t and y t represent the upper-limit for d t : We assume that the function m has the following characteristics
The …rst assumption tells us that there is a positive natural regeneration capacity rate: when no resources are devoted to abating pollution, the proportion of the pollution stock assimilated by natural factors (hereafter, the "natural" regeneration rate) is given by m 0 ; as in the previous section. The second assumption tells us that when all the resources of the economy are devoted to abatement expenditures, the whole current stock of pollution is assimilated. The third assumption tells us that the regeneration rate is monotonically increasing in d y . In order to …nd explicit solutions for the state and control variables, we assign the following explicit form to m ( ) which satis…es the previous 3 assumptions
The motion equation for E then becomes
Public abatement expenditures
In this section the decision to improve the regeneration capacity is a prefogative of the government, by means of an ex-post tax policy. That is, after agents' make their choice on n and c; the central planner taxes them, but instead of redistributing tax revenues by means of lump-sum transfers, she will channel funds from tax gains into pollution abatement technology. In other words, we assume that only the government can have access to any abatement technology.
If the central planner taxes income with a d tax rate, the governments'budget constraint is then
Residents solve the following problem
The Hamiltonian, the …rst-order and the euler conditions are the following
The resulting dynamic system is then
The two equilibrium manifolds (…g. 2) are given by
Again, the steady state exists, is unique and is locally a saddle 11 . Steady state values are given by
Let us focus on the environmental stock of resources. We …nd that
So that a pollution tax would always improve the environmental quality with respect to the market solution. Since when d = 0, E d = E ss ; we see that
so that the steady state stock of environmental resources is certainly higher than in the market solution without tax By contrast, it is not clear whether the sign of E d E cp is positive or negative given that (see …g. 3)
This condition can be easily met for su¢ ciently low values of m 0 : when the natural rate of regeneration is very low (and so the marginal impact of abatement technology is very high), a pollution tax would increase the environmental quality even with respect to the …rst-best policy. On the other hand, this condition never holds whenever m 0 is su¢ ciently high (m 0 > (1 ) (1+ )+( + ) ). As for tourist ‡ows we can note that
Hence this kind of abatement tax always increases the steady state number of entries with respect to both the market and the …rst-best solution.
The e¤ect on price, consumption and utility
The e¤ect of this pollution tax on prices is ambiguous. Willingness to pay depends positively on E and negatively on n: Since they both increase with d ; willingness to pay will be higher or lower according to di¤erent combinations of the relevant parameters of the model. In the …rst case, it will be possible to transfer part of the tax burden to the tourists. Although we have assumed a perfectly elastic demand for tourist services, we can interpret this situation as a sort of implicit tourist tax paid by tourists who, on the other hand, are compensated with a better quality in their chosen destination. It is therefore interesting to identify the conditions under which a pollution tax leads to an increase in the willingness to pay. A …rst factor to consider is the value of the price elasticity with respect to tax
which tells us that since
are positive, a pollution tax will always raise tourists WTP if they are "not-too-much" averse to crowding to (i.e., when is very low). Contrariwise, if they are very crowding-averse, their willingness to pay will be very sensitive to any increase in the number of tourists and their willingness. This is clearer if we write the price function as
We …nd that
so that per-capita environment is negatively in ‡uenced by the pollution tax (that is, the percentage increment of tourist entries due to the pollution tax is larger than the percentage increment of the environmental asset). As a consequence, when is su¢ ciently high, for example when = ; WTP decreases with d : In fact, on calculating
and seeing that the price elasticity
The lower ; is the closer will be to zero. A policy implication of this argument would be that, in order to transfer the tax burden towards foreign tourists, the host country has to address to "not-so-much" crowding-averse tourists, that is, mass-tourism (see …g. 4).
The behavior of consumption is more complex to be comprehend. It depends on d not only through the WTP but also positively through the e¤ect on n d and directly since the tax represents a means to force savings. Consumption elasticity on the pollution tax rate is given by
This expression is clearly negative when d is su¢ ciently large and will be negative for every value of d whenever is su¢ ciently high (elite tourism) and m 0 ; the natural regeneration rate, is very low (this is because the only positive term
=n ( d ) tends to zero). In this case, a pollution tax would always decrease consumption with respect to the market solution. However, consumption elasticity with respect to the pollution tax rate can be positive for low values of d ; with consumption increasing in the tax rate, whenever and m 0 are su¢ ciently low. Because consumption is a positive function of both price and n; it will certainly increases with d if is close to zero, while its behavior will be ambiguous whenever is su¢ ciently high. Figure 5 clari…es the relation between c and d according to di¤erent values of : For su¢ ciently high values of ; consumption always decreases with d whereas for su¢ ciently low values of ; a bell-shaped curve appears. Moreover, the tax rate which maximizes consumption shifts to the right, and then increases as decreases. That is, the less "snobbish" the kind of tourism supplied by the country, the higher the tax rate which maximizes consumption will be. Figure 6 describes the same relationship but takes into account di¤erent values of the natural rate of regeneration m 0 : As we can see, the introduction of a pollution tax would always decrease consumption if the natural regeneration rate is very high. This result is favoured by the fact that the larger m 0 ; the lower the productivity of the abatement technology. As m 0 decreases, a bellshaped curve appears again and there is a positive tax rate d which maximizes consumption. Moreover, and quite intuitively, d increases as m 0 decreases.
As for utility, it depends positively not only on consumption, but also on the stock of environmental asset E. The latter, as we have seen, is positively in ‡uenced by d so that, ceteris paribus, the pollution tax rate which maximizes utility will be higher than the tax rate which maximizes consumption. Formally, we …nd that, since steady state instantaneous utility is logarithmic, its derivative with respect to d is simply given by
is certainly negative for high values of d ; there must be a d such that
Moreover, it must be d > d . Figures 7 and 8 describe these relations.
Abatement expenditures as a choice variable
In this section we introduce the possibility that residents invest in the pollution abatement technology introduced before 12 . Individuals now have the possibility to use part of their income to improve the environment and therefore tourism revenues no longer coincide with consumption. In other words, we are allowing for a sort of savings decision which was not possible in the previous case: individuals save and invest their money in the environmental asset to increase their utility (E enters the utility function) 13 . Residents'income has now to be allocated between consumption and abatement expenditures y t n t p (n t ; E t ) = c t + d t abatement expenditures are considered as a fraction z t 2 (0; 1) of individuals' income d t = z t n t p (n t ; E t ) so that c t = (1 z t ) n t p (n t ; E t )
The market solution
As in the previous section, we characterize the market solution as a situation in which agents take WTP as given. Formally, a new control variable, z t ; is introduced in the following optimization problem. max (zt;ct;nt)
The Hamiltonian, the …rst-order and the euler conditions are as follows
By equating the …rst-order condition we can express z as functions of E and n
Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition on n, we …nd the optimal dynamics for n which is given by
By using (21) we can eliminate one control variable and completely characterize the optimal dynamic system as
The two equilibrium manifolds are given by
Steady-state analysis
Unlike in the model without abatement expenditures, the _ n = 0 locus is now a bell-shaped curve 14 . The _ E = 0 locus, by contrast, remains a decreasing straight line but now its inclination is given by 1 2 and its vertical intercept by
Since n z 1 (0) = n z 2 (0) ; the two curves intersect only once in the positive orthant of the plane (E; n) : The steady state with non-negative z; n and E is therefore unique and is given by
Substituting in (21) we obtain the steady state value for z
So agents choose a positive saving only when m 0 ; the natural regeneration rate, is not too high. Roughly speaking, if the environment is in a good shape, there is no need to spend money to safeguard it.
As for stability, we can state the following Proposition 3 The equilibrium (E; n) = (E z ss ; n z ss ) is locally a saddle point for the system (22), (23).
Proof. In the appendix
Comparative statics
There is no particular change, with respect to the market solution without abatement expenditures, in the way the steady state values of E and n depend on the model's parameters except that now the steady state values of both E and n no longer depend on m 0 . As for z; we see that it only depends, negatively, on m 0 : This is related to the fact that the marginal productivity of the abatement technology with respect to z is simply (1 m 0 ) ; so that an increase in m 0 will lead to a lower productivity of z and then to a higher opportunity cost of savings.
Note also that E
However, since for m 0 > 1 2 we …nd that z z ss = 0; and since with zero abatement expenditure E z ss = E ss and n z ss = n ss ; the steady state values of E and n are always higher in this case than in the case without abatement expenditures.
What happens to income? Even if the willingness to pay can be higher or lower according to di¤erent values of m 0 ; and 15 ; it is straightforward to answer this question if we realize that income with abatement expenditures is equal to income without abatement expenditures when m 0 reaches its upperlimit 1=2 y ss j m0=1=2 = y z ss and since @yss @m0 > 0 8m 0 ; we see that, quite reasonably, income increases when we factor in the possibility of defending the environment. 1 5 Note that E z ss n z ss < Ess nss 8m 0 < 1 2 so that per-capita environment decreases in the solution with defensive expenditures. An intuition for this apparently counterintuitive results can be given by the fact that yet in the case without technology abatement, per-capita environment were a decreasing function of the regeneration capacity 
1+
So it might be greater than c ss whenever z is not too big (i.e. m 0 is su¢ -ciently high) and is not too large (…g. 9).
As for steady state utility, as long as agents assign a positive value to z; utility increases by de…nition.
The central planner solution
As in the previous case, the central planner will now take into account the fact that agents' decisions in ‡uence tourists' willingness to pay. The hamiltonian, the …rst-order and euler equation of the optimization problem are as follows
From the …rst-order conditions we obtain z as a function of E and n:
Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition on n we get
Substituting for z in (27) and in the motion equation, we obtain the dynamic system which characterizes the equilibrium _ n t n t = n t (1 )
where we notice that, unlike in the case without technology abatement, the central planner decision changes the dynamics of E. This is because of the presence of z whose steady state value is di¤erent according to whether it is decided by the market or by the central planner. Notice, however, that the di¤erence between the two choices is determined exclusively by (the externality on n) and not by (the externality related to E). In other words, as tends to zero, the central planner solution on z tends to the market solution and therefore the two dynamics of E turn out to be the same even if > 0:
Steady state analysis
The two equilibrium manifolds (…g. 10) are given by
The equilibrium with non-negative z; n and E exists and is unique for the same reason stated in the market case and is given by.
We notice that
which may seem counterintuitive at …rst sight. The explanation for this is that the decision about z involves only the marginal value of n (which is lower in the central planner solution) and not the marginal value of E (which is higher in the central planner solution). Since the shadow price of z must be equal to the marginal value of n and the shadow price of z (which is equal in both the solutions) is an increasing function of z; the central planner solution requires a lower level of z: One result connected to this issue is that the value of the natural regeneration capacity m 0 such that the central planner will decide to invest a positive level of resources in the PAT is lower than the market case. Fig. 11 describes the behavior of consumption, income and abatement expenditures considered as functions of crowding aversion : As we can see 16 , while abatement expenditures are always lower in the centralized solution, there is a = such that income in the centralized solution becomes higher than in the market solution. For an even lower < , consumption also becomes higher in the centralized solution. In this case, the which reverses the ordering relation is lower because centralized consumption is positively in ‡uenced by since a higher means a lower fraction devoted to abatement expenditures. By contrast, market consumption is in ‡uenced by only through the willingness to pay.
But the ordering relation between consumption and income in the centralized and market solution changes, as in the case without abatement expenditures, even with respect to residents'love for the environment . As …g. 12 shows, if is not too high, consumption and income are both larger in the central planner solution.
The e¤ect of a corrective tax on income
Introducing the level of abatement expenditures as a choice variable opens the door to a variety of tax policies. In this section we focus speci…cally on a corrective tax analogous to the one applied to the case where there was no abatement expenditures. In this case, a corrective tax scheme was successful, i.e., it was capable of directing the economy along the …rst-best dynamic path. We will show that this is no longer true when we introduce the option of saving: a corrective tax may increase steady state utility with respect to the market solution, but utility never reaches the centralized level. The di¤erence stems from the fact that now, since a new choice variable (z) has been introduced, one policy instrument alone is not su¢ cient to ensure reaching the …rst-best solution.
We then assume that a tax z is imposed by the government on tourist revenues. Tax revenues are then redistributed to agents with lump-sum transfers. The government budget constraint is given by z n t p (n t ; E t ) = v t
where v t are the lump-sum transfers. Individuals' budget constraint is then given by (1 z ) n t p (n t ; E t ) + v t = c t + d t Considering that abatement expenditures are a fraction z of the income, we obtain the following: c t = (1 z t ) (1 z ) n t p (n t ; E t ) + (1 z) v t Agents solve the following problem taking p and v t as given
First-order and euler conditions are given by
Tax revenues are redistributed once agents'decisions are made. Substituting for v t using (31) and equating the two …rst-order condition we …nd z as a function of n and E
(
where we notice that for z = the tax solution for z equates to the …rst-best solution.
Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition on n, equating it to the euler equation and eliminating the z variable, we can characterize the steady state property of the model with the following system _ n t n t = n t 1
First-order and euler conditions for this problem are given by
According to these conditions, the optimal value of z; as a function of n and E; is
Di¤erentiating the FOC on n, equating to the euler equation and substituting for and z; we …nd
which is identical to the dynamic path resulting from the market solution without tax. The motivation for these results depends on the particular utility function chosen and lies in the fact that once a tax is imposed on agents, they readapt their optimal choice on z in such a way that the total amount of abatement expenditures remain unchanged.
Conclusions
We have studied the dynamic evolution of a small open economy specialized in tourism based on natural resources when tourism services are supplied to foreign tourists who are averse to crowding adverse and who are willing to pay for environmental quality. We have analysed the steady-state properties and ran several policy exercises in two versions of the model: in the …rst, private agents'income is entirely spent on consumption while, in the second, agents are allowed to invest part of their income in pollution abatement technology (PAT) which arti…cially increases the regeneration rate of the environmental asset. A unique locally saddle point equilibrium has been found in both versions and for both the market and the central planner solutions. We also found that: 1) a corrective tax on income raises steady state utility in both versions but is capable of directing the economy in its …rst-best dynamic path only when agents cannot invest in the PAT; 2) when PAT is available to the government but not to agents, an income tax which …nances abatement expenditures may increase steady state utility with respect to the market solution when both the natural regeneration rate of the environment and the degree of crowding aversion are low enough; 3) when PAT is available, the market chooses to devote a fraction of income to abatement higher than the optimal solution but which is positive only when the natural rate of regeneration is not too large; 4) when PAT is avalilable an income pollution tax totally ine¤ective. expenditures are always lower in the cp solution, when is large enough consumption is higher in the centralized solution. For an even larger ; also income may be higher in the centralized solution 
